INTRODUCTION
Humanitarian action is increasingly understood as part of peace-building agendas and is associated with processes of global governance, in which international actors manage and intervene in the sovereign affairs of conflict-affected and fragile states in intimate ways (Duffield 2007; Agier 2011; Barnett 2011; Donini 2012; Fassin 2012) . It is related to the will to transform societies and build states that are able to deal with political conflict in ways that don't result in war (Duffield 2002; Bliesemann de Guevara 2012a: 15) . Simultaneously however, humanitarian action also remains a particular field of principled activities that aspire to aid people in need, separated from other forms of collaborative international engagement and power. This presents us with a paradox of humanitarianism: what happens under its label is both embedded in political processes of post-conflict state building and exceptional as principled emergency relief. However, the ways in which this paradox materializes in practice, and the specific challenges that result from this, are poorly understood. Much academic debate tends to shy away from this ambiguous paradox and perceives this as a politicization, erosion or misunderstanding of a pure and moral humanitarianism, or as unintended consequences of a mandate shift in which humanitarianism somehow got mixed up with geo-political interests and aspirations. These understandings fail to grasp how contemporary humanitarian governance is a manifestation of the internationalization of non-western states, in which international and local forms of power are blurred. This is not action gone wrong, or a misunderstanding of norms and principles, but rather a post-political humanitarianism that takes on governmental aspirations, but is too narrowly understood, legitimized and communicated as normative, principal and practical action.
In this paper I take the case of South Sudan to explore this paradox of humanitarian aid as both exceptional and embedded action, and the consequent blurring of international and local forms of power and its effects. In December 2013 South Sudan relapsed into civil war after a peace agreement in 2005 and separation from Sudan in 2011 had allowed for a fragile peace.
After the escalation at the end of 2013, questions arose over whether the international community, a broad assemblage of actors comprised of the UN, donor states, international NGOs and other actors, had allowed for, or even fostered, the escalation of the political situation in the new state. This followed the idea that war, peace and intervention produced a state in which the international community was accorded, and accorded itself, a place and influence in the governance of the new country.
This was not uncontested however, and over the years aid actors were increasingly faced with hostility, threats, appropriations of aid assets, and insecurity at the hands of local authorities.
In this context, the maintenance of humanitarian aid roles in South Sudan necessitated continuous negotiations with local authorities, that increasingly appropriated, hindered, frustrated or attacked aid efforts, or threatened to do so, or allowed this to occur by third parties. Usual explanations about this form of insecurity dwell on the South Sudanese authorities as dysfunctional, inexperienced, corrupt or nepotistic, and offer limited reflection on humanitarianism itself, and its relations with the authorities and power holders in South Sudan. Instead, in this paper I analyse how processes of negotiating humanitarian access contributed to the consolidation of a particular political economy of aid, in which insecurity played a mediating role. It offers an understanding of insecurity facing aid agencies, and the ways this is managed, that recognises the ambiguous roles that humanitarian agencies televised press conference in military uniform, it became clear that after only two and a half years of independence, South Sudan was experiencing an escalation of conflict that, unlike several other regional insurgencies that had been plaguing the county in the postindependence years, had the potential to grow out into an all-out civil war. And it did.
Relations between the main political leaders had already been sour for some time. As violence spread and became partly organized along ethnic lines, people used labels such as 'ethnic conflict' to explain the upsurge of war, while others constructed a more elaborate picture of how power politics in South Sudan is associated with patronage systems, and that ethnicity was only a partial driver for the conflict, and more a consequence than a cause.
The latter genre of explanations implies that state power in South Sudan has been a matter of keeping various factions and potential volatile and disruptive elements in line by including them in a 'kleptocratic elite ' (De Waal 2014) . As a result, various pockets of rebellion that arose since (and before) independence have been dealt with by integrating rebel forces into the government army, and rewarding rebel factions with rents, or high positions in government or the army (Thomas 2015) , indicating that the government instead of a monolithic body, rather represented a herogenous constellation as the outcome of bargaining among contending elites (Twijnstra 2015) . As a result of these patterns of patronage, a politico-military elite has consolidated a neo-patrimonial rule, more engaged with accommodating its power constituency than with building a viable state and state institutions (De Waal 2014; Pinaud 2014) . State resources were siphoned off to this elite to such an extent that even the considerable resources that the new state had access to vanished into satisfying this patronage network and personal gain. In De Waal's reading of the clashes, diminishing oil revenues due to an oil shutdown in the previous year, and plain greed, meant that by 2013 there were no resources available to keep the patronage system running, and things fell apart.
There were signs preceding this: political quarrels and the reshuffling in the ruling SPLM party and government earlier in 2013, such as the stripping of power of the Vice President.
Corruption had been a word on many lips in the international community, including humanitarians, since the new state's inception. Although presented as endemic, many donors and aid actors regarded corruption as an abuse of the system -a flaw which they targeted with their programmes of post-conflict state-building, with the intention of strengthening the very state institutions able to combat this abuse. Yet as De Waal (2014) These claims were pointed directly at donor states and the Troika or other unilateral or multilateral actors who were accorded a powerful role in steering and influencing South Sudanese politics, and not at humanitarian organisations, with their claim for a specific political niche that is distinct from the wider international arena. But on the ground, either more general forms of international assistance and donorship carried a humanitarian label in one way or another, or humanitarian agencies themselves were directly linked to or associated with the international aid system that was one of the driving forces in the post-conflict reconstruction of South Sudan.
The suggestion that humanitarianism may have contributed to shaping an 'abusive' political economy of aid is strongly related to the ambiguous position of humanitarian action as both exceptional and embedded. There is a need to develop a more critical understanding of this ambiguity for three reasons. First, because the arbitrary use -or rather multiple understandings -of the label 'humanitarian' presents a taken-for-granted ambiguity that is problematic. It is an operational term, and is applied and acted upon by governments, donors, and aid agencies despite this ambiguity and may have certain effects, for instance with regard to understanding and approaching insecurity, as I will argue below.
The humanitarian community itself is diffuse. It is an arena in which different actors operate under different labels, such as post-conflict reconstruction, emergency relief, humanitarian or development aid, capacity building and many more (Goodhand 2002; Hilhorst & Jansen 2010; Salomons 2015) . Moreover, it is part of that wider international community, together with the UN apparatus, multilateral and donor organisations, states, individual (I)NGOs, private and military actors, in an 'international community' that is rarely defined (Veit 2010 ). Yet the label 'humanitarian' carries a distinctly different connotation than 'aid' or 'development,' and humanitarians position themselves vis-a-vis the state and others accordingly. The humanitarian principles neutrality, independence and impartiality serve as a way of selfidentification and legitimization, and are used -and believed -to claim safe access to people and territory. In this understanding, humanitarianism necessarily depends and acts on this image of action exceptional to the state and international politics. This 'necessary fiction' (Rieff 2011 ) thus sustains the taken-for-granted ambiguity of humanitarian aid. Third, much academic attention to (humanitarian) aid and peace-building is too 'aid-centric'
and risks exaggerating the importance of aid and external aid interventions (Goodhand 2002: 841; Barnett 2008; D. H. Johnson 2014) . As a result these approaches accord a specific role to organisational identities and discourses, that do not necessarily match realities on the ground.
For instance, the stressing of principles may be understood as important, effective and relevant in the eye of the aid giver, but irrelevant to aid receivers and local authorities. It is important to reflect on how humanitarianism is represented in academia, and how emergency discourses and problem-solving perspectives shape our analyses (Bakewell 2008; Barnett 2008) . Similarly, it is important to recognise the differences between how humanitarianism is represented and how it actually materializes on the ground may be tainted by aid centred and normative perspectives.
This paper explores how negotiating access is related to this ambiguous duality of exceptionalism and embeddedness of contemporary humanitarian governance. More specifically it looks at how aid actors perceived and organized these negotiations around understandings of (in)security. In the next paragraphs, after a short methodological note, I
will first reconsider this paradox of a humanitarianism in relation to the political. Then I will discuss how humanitarian action became increasingly embedded as part of a humanitarian protectorate, which not only implies a political role and position in relation to the larger international community, including international military forces, but also inherently affects the relation between aid and the state. Lastly, I will discuss how this impacts on relations between humanitarian and state actors. I will argue that the gaining and maintaining of humanitarian access sustained a political economy of aid. The result is that refusing, frustrating or endangering access is not so much an abuse or misunderstanding of humanitarian assistance to people in need, but rather the mediation of a potentially powerful humanitarian protectorate. In order to gain an understanding of this environment and the experiences and positioning of aid actors, this study applied ethnography to study humanitarian agencies, rationales and programs and its effects, also referred to aidnography. This allowed for an actor oriented approach to study crisis response, in which contradictions, personality and positionality are taken into consideration to analyse how everyday practices, perceptions and perspectives of aid are the outcome of social negotiation.
METHODOLOGY
Although problematic from a methodological point of view, almost without exception, this research took place under conditions of anonymity. As a result, the presented field data is largely void of references to specific UN and NGO agencies, and the people interviewed, and the locations where they took place. I trust that the general presentation of relevant field data and the theoretical embeddedness is sufficient for a valid support of my argumentation. From another angle, this very limitation also highlights how maintaining humanitarian access in South Sudan is a sensitive affair, and the condition of anonymity and other measures to conceal the identity of people and their institutional affiliations, is a case in point for the role of insecurity in the political economy of aid.
HUMANITARIAN GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF NON-WESTERN STATES
References to humanitarian aid as a coherent set of activities that is distinct from development, human rights, or other forms of international action are problematic.
Humanitarianism covers a range of ethical, practical and organizational identities and
identifications, yet the label is consequently used without recognizing the inherent variability and multiplicity, and indeed taken for granted as a clear-cut concept (Donini & Walker 2012) .
Instead, humanitarian practice is comprised of different discourses, expressions, aspirations, ethics and programmes, that often intersect or overlap, but also compete with each other as part of larger humanitarian aims (Lester & Dussart 2014: 17) .
Two distinct approaches to humanitarianism can be distinguished. One is a strictly non- Alternatively, these two poles are sometimes referred to as 'emergency humanitarianism', which restricts itself solely to life-saving activities and 'alchemical humanitarianism' which seeks to remove the causes of suffering, and moves closer to the field of development (Barnett 2011: 22) .
Although many humanitarian actors position and identify themselves somewhere near the minimalist positions, in practice they allow themselves various degrees of politicization, and the two poles are much more practically and historically interrelated. One school of thought sees this politicization, or alchemical humanitarianism, as a recent post 9/11 development, and as a regression from an earlier period of 'successful', 'pure' and 'ethical' humanitarianism (Fassin 2012) , in which the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence were respected (Barnett 2011: 2-5; Smillie 2012) . This idea of a pure and ethical humanitarianism fails to recognise other, inherently liberal, parallels to earlier modes of global governance that Goodhand notes how 'the aid community used the motif of the "failed state" to assume and justify itself as a "surrogate government" ' (2002: 844) . The result is the internationalization of One year later, the aid agencies rebuilt their compounds adjacent to the new compound of the Indian Battalion of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The walls around the UNMISS compound were unmistakably higher than those of the humanitarians', which were little more than thorn fences, apart from the sections where their compounds touched.
The soldiers and the humanitarians were only separated by this wall, but in case of threat or emergency, humanitarian staff could quickly enjoy the 'force protection' of the Indian soldiers and evacuate to their compound, and from there get into UNMISS helicopters or those of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS).
On the other side of town were some other compounds close together, a loosely fenced NGO campsite, where other groups found housing; a corporate organization, rather indistinguishable from an NGO, lodged here too. The adjacent compound housed a hospital and other NGO quarters. Several times a day, an Indian armed personnel carrier drove by to observe the situation, chat and move on. A fortnight before my visit there was a rebel attack and these aid staff were evacuated to the UNMISS compound where they spent the night.
Spatially and practically the humanitarians and the wider mission were separate, yet they were together.
The material and spatial practices of humanitarian agencies are easily neglected due to the focus on programmatic goals, intentions and outputs (Smirl 2015 Many aid actors suggested that the South Sudanese authorities, and the population in general, had grown accustomed to aid coming their way. International aid workers referred to the taken-for-granted ways in which South Sudanese authorities claimed aid assets or sought to influence aid distribution and programmes. Several respondents argued that there was an 'entitlement attitude' with local authorities seeking to control and influence humanitarian aid.
Humanitarians do not operate in a void, and countries recovering from war are no tabula rasa , and authorities logically claimed their own sovereignty (not in the least because of the state building and empowerment rhetoric of the international agencies themselves). The humanitarian project, which by and large had embraced the twin aims of aiding people and building the state, needed to cooperate with state actors but did not want them to impede on humanitarianism itself, while local state actors wanted to have a say over the distribution of resources and ideas. Some NGOs experienced this as a shrinking of the 'humanitarian space', which became clear by an increase in harassments, administrative hurdles and security incidents. Others reasoned that the obstruction of aid could be interpreted as a way of countering a large and powerful collection of international interventions, and of laying claim to sovereignty. In this reading, the tacit trusteeship between the actors of the humanitarian protectorate and the South Sudanese state was mediated by insecurity.
In many ways, and on many levels, local authorities, the security forces, and other power holders such as local stakeholders, bureaucrats and politicians, contributed to insecurity for humanitarian actors. In response, addressing this insecurity in everyday processes of gaining and maintaining humanitarian access, consolidated a political economy of aid. In other words, for humanitarians to stay, they had to pay, or give way.
ASPIRATION, SECURITY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AID
There is a well-documented history -if not a genre -of how aid in South Sudan was However, the claim that this is down to 'misunderstandings' is normative and aspirational, and draws attention away from the political economy of aid, and its longevity and historical precedent.
De Waal notes: 'over the years, SPLA officers became oriented towards an apparently unending supply of international humanitarian aid, which could be stolen with impunity'. He adds that 'NGOs and donors often connived in this ' (2014: 352) . In other words, NGOs allowed, condoned or facilitated the abuse of their aid. One reading of this is that accommodating demands of local authorities is a part of negotiating humanitarian access, in the sense of an 'acceptance' strategy in which aid actors seek to foster good relations with local authorities, power holders, and communities as a security strategy (Egeland et al. 2011) .
My fieldwork revealed how aid actors believed and experienced that confronting and challenging authorities and other stakeholders with what was in their eyes abusive or problematic behaviour towards the humanitarian imperative, had led to a loss of access, threats, or an early exit. From this perspective then, allowing a certain amount of abuse, can be understood as an aspect of a 'will to stay', and is in effect a form of manoeuvring around insecurity and negotiating access.
An interesting example was a government directive that stipulated that all aid that enters the country should remain there and be handed over to the state after aid programmes end, including humanitarian assets such as jeeps, office equipment, communication devices, and so on. Many interviewed staff had experiences with claims related to that directive. One NGO staff member explained how a local county authority in Raga forbade the NGO staff from crossing county boundaries in their vehicles, as they claimed that these belonged to the government. The NGO in question felt that it was being held hostage, and in the end they closed the programme. I encountered variations of this type of experience with other NGOs in other areas also.
Since all aid and aid infrastructure entering (South) Sudan, even during the implementation of the aid programme, was claimed as belonging to the government, local authorities felt a legitimate claim over humanitarian assets, and this puts notions of manipulation and abuse in a different light. These were not isolated incidents, or a phenomenon that only emerged after the CPA, but something that had its roots in a longer existing political economy of aid and predates South Sudan's separation (see also: D. H. Johnson 2007: 160) . As a result, there was a constant struggle over humanitarian assets, their allocation and target audience and purpose, as part of cooperation between authorities and NGOs, that in many instances was aimed at the betterment of communities and constituencies of powerful local actors, but sometimes also for a more individual aim. For instance, there were claims that government staff owned NGO cars that they had appropriated and kept at home as their private property. I had lunch with one retired government staff who had two in his compound, still marked with NGO license plates.
Challenging, protesting over and confronting what humanitarians described as abuse, misconduct, or infringements to humanitarian access has led to what Jok refers to as 'bureaucratic war ' (2007: 265) -involvig the imposition of extra taxes, regulations and permits. but also violent confrontations, arbitrary arrests of aid staff, and appropriation of aid assets. The insecurity facing aid organizations and aid workers was often the direct result of government, army or local authority actions -or inaction -that demanded resources and assistance from them (See also : Fast, et al 2011 : 27: Bennett 2013 Stoddard et al. 2012). 7 Illustrative is an example of a hospital in Lakes state that was maintained, staffed and financed by an NGO that intended to hand it over to the state Ministry of Health after the initial phase. The NGO experienced threats and harassment because the state demanded that the NGO continue with its programme and was forced to continuing operating the program for some time, before abandoning the project, and the state, altogether due to the soured relation and the threats. Similar examples were given, with many having regular experiences of ministries or county officials seeking to influence the distribution of aid resources: where and when to stock clinics with medicines and other provisions, where to build schools, and who to employ, such as relatives and clan members. Through such strategies, local power brokers benefited their own communities and gained political legitimacy: they could claim aid delivery was the result of their own efforts to support their constituencies and they could make life difficult for NGOs if their demands were not met by rallying the very communities to act against the very aid agencies in case of non-compliance, or threats thereto.
In many cases, NGOs stayed but had to deal with demanding authorities and manoeuvre their way through these situations, by underplaying them, refraining from reporting them or complaining publicly, or finding other ways around the situation in order to remain operative. expatriates' narrative that they come to "help" host populations enables them to claim the moral high ground, while symbolic and material resources place expatriates in a dominant position ' (2014: 250) . This dominant position, and the claim for humanitarian space for maintaining operational presence and access, reflects the exceptionality that humanitarian workers lay claim to. However, these claims were countered by demands by local power holders seeking influence over aid assets and programmes. By thwarting aid, local authorities found a way to exert some sovereignty over the humanitarians, and other international actors.
By making the humanitarians feel insecure the local authorities were able to keep a check on international interference, and indeed the roll-out of a humanitarian protectorate.
To return to Veit's (2010) exposé about intermediaries in indirect governance, it became clear during the interviews that for both aid workers and local authorities, access was very much, dependent on personal capacities, relations and motivations. As such we cannot adopt a blanket notion of corruption, neo-patrimonialism or abuse. Some collaborations with local authorities worked very well, while other areas were more challenging than others -the problematic states and regions could be pinpointed quite easily, for instance Raga, Lakes and Warrap were seen as notorious, whereas Western and Central Equatoria were considered more easy. To some extent these differentiations were part of ethnic relations between local and state power, specifically in Warrap and Lakes, which allowed for a certain impunity of local powerholders, that was absent in other areas. Yet in other places such as Jonglei and Unity, there was history of impunity due to local pockets of rebellion, and the armed responses of the state. As a general pattern, aid staff, almost without exception, saw the relations between them and state actors as difficult.
This resonates with Marriage's observation of the Sudanese government as 'a distant, antidevelopment force ' (2006: 123) . Although she was referring to a pre-separation context, observations since independence indicate that the government of South Sudan quickly became another (and according to some a more extreme) version of the Khartoum government when it comes to dealing with NGOs. One way of facing the powerful 'republic of NGOs' (as Schuller (2012) described Haiti, where NGOs tended to side line and bypass the government)
is by creating insecurity, or other hurdles. Rather than being the outcome of a dysfunctional system, this might be instrumental in the sense of protecting sovereignty on the local level, or a sense thereof.
Humanitarians' 'will to stay' and their negotiating of humanitarian access is one way in which humanitarians become part of a neo-patrimonial network. As Veit notes about DRCongo, 'through reliance on powerful local forces, interventions are generally likely to modify, if not only reproduce, pre-conflict forms of political exchange, rather than being able to implement new patterns of power and domination' (Veit 2010: 36) . In South Sudan this implies that aid actors have to negotiate their presence, balancing between practical considerations and principled ideas, thwarting authorities and circumventing local complexities. These may well include 'abuse' of aid resources, and legitimizing the very 'abusers' along the way, by accommodating them in one way or another because of the will to stay. The history and praxis of negotiating humanitarian access shows that it is difficult to separate humanitarian agencies from the patrimonial state. The paradox of humanitarianism, although opportunistically dissociated from the larger post-conflict intervention, is that it is simultaneously embedded as part of a wider humanitarian protectorate that is contested, challenged and opposed.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have explored the relation between humanitarian aid and insecurity in South Sudan between 2011 and 2013. The experiences with insecurity for aid agencies at the hand of local authorities, armed forces and others, can be understood as part of everyday practices of negotiating and maintaining humanitarian access. Perceiving this insecurity as violations and abuses of a pure, moral and practical humanitarianism, reflects a narrow and problematic understanding of humanitarianism as normative, principal and practical action. Instead, humanitarian action in South Sudan in practice was largely embedded in broader peace and state building programmes and co-operations. Although many aid actors positioned themselves as principled and exceptional humanitarian actors, in practice they were part of, and maintained, a political economy of aid that was constantly negotiated and contested, particularly because of the governmental roles and to some extent aspirations of the international organisations. In this understanding, insecurity was a symptom of the blurring of international and local forms of power, and a check on a potentially powerful humanitarian protectorate.
